Hardblogger : Lt. Col. Rick Francona

Tour length isn't the problem

Hardball — Thu, 12 Apr 2007 15:00:00 GMT

Adjusting combat tour length doesn’t solve the problem

Secretary of Defense of Gates announced Wednesday that he is extending the combat tour length for active duty U.S. Army soldiers from the standard 12 months to 15 months, with the commitment that the period between combat rotations will be 12 months. This announcement does not affect the reserve components of the Army – the Reserves and National Guard – nor does it affect the length of deployment for the U.S. Marines, currently seven months.

While that sounds like it will provide more troops for the commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, in reality many of the troops are extended for that extra three months anyway. In the past, that was the most effective way to plus up the number of troops: maintain the inbound schedule but retain units about to rotate home an extra three months. In effect, this formalizes the longer tour length that has been imposed on many of the soldiers who have served and are serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The objective is to provide soldiers at least 12 months between combat tours, and at the same time provide higher levels of troops in the region. It’s robbing Peter to pay Paul. It will work in the short term, but at some point, you run out of soldiers.

The problem is not the tour length; it’s the fact that we do not have a sufficient number of soldiers – or Marines for that matter – to maintain the scale and pace of operations, the “ops tempo,” currently assigned to the armed forces.

Let’s be clear about our armed forces. Plain and simple, the all-volunteer force works. We have fielded the best-trained and best-equipped military in our history. At the end of the Cold War, we drew our forces down to what are now unacceptable levels. The problem is that there are not enough of them.

There are proposals to increase the size of the land component, the Army and Marines, by as much as 100,000 troops to supplement the existing 500,000 plus troops. That’s the minimum that is required if we are going to maintain presence in the world’s hot spots – right now that is Iraq and Afghanistan – and be prepared to defend our interests around the world wherever challenged. That challenge might come elsewhere in the Middle East – Iran comes to mind – or in Korea, Taiwan, or the Horn of Africa. We must be ready to act when needed, not worry about raising the required numbers after the crisis presents itself. When we decide that a deployment of U.S. forces is required, we need to send them in numbers that indicate we mean business.

We can’t do that now. On at least one occasion in the last year, the Pentagon was forced to deploy the 82nd Airborne Division’s “ready brigade” to Iraq. This is the unit that is supposed to be on call to respond to a crisis anywhere on a moment’s notice. It’s hard to do that when deployed to Iraq.

The interests of a nation of 300 million people can hardly be defended by one half of one percent of the population. We spend about four percent of GDP on defense. In today’s world, that’s not enough.

Questions abound after British sailors released

Hardball — Wed, 04 Apr 2007 18:18:00 GMT

The Iranians have decided to release the 15 British sailors and Marines they have held hostage for over 12 days. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that he had “pardoned” the British during the celebration of the birth of the prophet, which this year almost coincides with Easter. To the world, he appears to have made a magnanimous gesture.

Good news, of course, but now comes the post mortem. There are many questions to be answered, not the least of which are what did the British give to secure the release of their service members, and will Iran pay a price for their action?

Most of the world believes the British were operating in Iraqi waters and this whole affair was engineered by the Iranians to draw attention from its nuclear program. Inside Iran, the affair may have played well - distrust of the British is an ingrained emotion. It was Britain, after all, that granted Iraq total sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab when they created the country in the aftermath of World War One. It is that same body of water that sparked decades of disputes between Iran and Iraq, including 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. It is also the venue of the current Iranian action against the British anti-smuggling team. The current border in the waterway is the thalweg, the deepest part of the channel, not always easy to define – confrontations are probably unavoidable.

So what did the British give to secure the release of their service members? The Royal Navy has always maintained that their naval units were operating inside Iraqi territorial waters, and it appears that stance has not changed. That said, several of the 15 Britons did make “confessions” on Iranian television. I suspect they will be called on to explain that decision. It’s a tough call for a detainee to make – do I go on television and perform as demanded to prevent mistreatment of my subordinates, do I appear to send a message to my government and family that I am alive and well, or refuse to comply and suffer the consequences? I am sure the Royal Navy will ask.

Probably more important in the long run, what price does Iran pay? In recent days, some commentators believe Iran will emerge from this situation as the winner. How can that be? They precipitated the crisis. The immediate reaction to the “pardon” and release is that the Iranians are the good guys in this. I hope not. Ahmadinejad found a face-saving way out of a mess he created – nothing more.

The Iranians need to be held accountable for this charade. They probably won’t. That may be in fact the British accommodation.

Memo to Tehran: Give it up

Hardball — Fri, 30 Mar 2007 16:54:00 GMT

Okay guys, you stepped in it this time. You really need to figure out a face-saving way to get out of the mess you have created by seizing 15 British sailors and marines.

Your past record is abominable, so what makes you think that anyone is buying this fiction that the British were in Iranian waters? Putting young British sailors on Iranian television reciting obviously coerced “confessions” is ludicrous – no one but possibly the most gullible among your domestic audience takes these statements as fact. Even more ridiculous are the letters written by the sole woman among the detainees, as well as her appearances in a chador. Again, do you really think that anyone believes this charade is how members of the Royal Navy would comport themselves in captivity?

Of course, one only needs to look back on the glorious history of the Islamic Republic to answer that question. After all, you are the same people that seized the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and held over 50 American diplomats hostage for more than a year. In 1982, you deployed your Qods Force to Lebanon to create another laudable group – Hezbollah. Not happy with just that feat, you began taking hostages there, seizing and murdering the CIA Chief of Station in Beirut and a U.S. Marine colonel serving with the United Nations.

Your handling of the 2004 incident—the three-day detention of eight British sailors and marines in a similar incident—was only marginally better. Yes, you got your “apology” and tried to embarrass the British on the world stage.

News flash: No one believes you!

Your recent statement that you will release the 15 Britons when the United Kingdom withdraws its forces from Iraq is reminiscent of similar demands made by Iraqi insurgents and al-Qaida in Iraq members after they had seized nationals of coalition member countries. Are you sure you want to be cast in the same light as terrorist cutthroats?

What you are doing now appears to be a childish reaction to the United Nations Security Council’s unanimous vote to toughen sanctions on you for your defiance of the world over your uranium enrichment activities. The impression that you have made on the world—when Iran does not get its way, it takes hostages. Now there’s a legacy for the Islamic Republic….

Now that you have shown your true colors, do your really think that anyone is going to trust you when you make claims about your “nuclear energy” research program?
One could reach the conclusion that you guys are looking for a fight. Keep this up and you just might get one.

Withdrawal date for Iraq aids the enemy

Hardball — Fri, 23 Mar 2007 19:37:00 GMT

On the surface, the initial “surge” statistics from Baghdad appear encouraging. By all measures, the number of deaths is down, the number of attacks is down and the number of Iraqi security forces on the street is up.

Good news, right?

Sure, but has the surge solved the problems of sectarian violence in the city and environs? Not if you look at the continued vicious Sunni attacks against the Shia in an attempt to provoke them to reignite the conflict, and the recent attack on a Sunni deputy prime minister. Thus far, the Sunnis have been unsuccessful in goading the Shia into retaliation – the Shia have followed the advice of their religious leadership and not rejoined the fight.

The leader of the most infamous of the Shia militias, Muqtada al-Sadr has instructed his fighters in an-Najaf and Baghdad to lay low while the Americans and Iraqis conduct the surge. American officials believe that al-Sadr has sought refuge in Iran, and his key lieutenants are hiding in the southern cities of Iraq. This is good strategy – wait out the Americans and the surge. When it is over and the Americans begin to reduce troops levels, al-Sadr will return and resume his political activities, militia intact.

The U.S. House of Representatives has included a provision in the supplemental war funding bill requiring that all American forces be withdrawn from Iraq by a specified date. This plays right into not only Shia militia leaders like Muqtada al-Sadr, but the Sunni insurgents as well, be they Iraqi Baathists, Islamists or the al-Qaeda in Iraq group. Once they know when American forces will be gone, they will use that as a planning date for their operations. Their goal will be to survive until that date, knowing that afterwards they will only be confronting Iraqi forces. When the Americans mount offensives between now and then, the insurgents will melt away, waiting out the mandated and published American timetable.

This does not solve the problem; it merely defers it to the future. Both sides in the Iraqi civil war are waiting for their moment. Up until the U.S. Congress imposes a mandatory withdrawal date, the Shia would have been content to lay low while American troops focus on the Sunnis. Now the Sunnis have the same option.

The Congress will be giving both sides hope – with good reason. I have problems with the Pentagon’s conduct of the war, but this action on the part of Congress will guarantee failure in Iraq. This is bad strategy.

Gulf Arabs draw a red line against Iran

Hardball — Mon, 19 Mar 2007 14:07:00 GMT

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will be heading to New York to address the United Nations in hopes of convincing the world that his country’s nuclear research program is for energy and not weapons. He has complemented that effort with rhetoric that a military strike on his country’s nuclear facilities will lead to dire consequences.

The Arab countries across the Gulf from Iran are watching this unfolding situation with great concern. An expected consequence of a military strike on Iran is an Iranian attempt to the close the Straits of Hormuz, a narrow waterway between Oman and Iran. About 25 percent of the world’s oil supply moves through the straits – most of it from the Gulf Arabs. For years, Iran has been developing military capabilities that will allow it to close the strategic waterway.

Disruption of the flow of oil through the straits is of concern to not just the Gulf Arabs, but the rest of the world as well. Although the United States imports less than 20 percent of its oil from the Gulf, oil is a fungible commodity. If that much oil was taken off the markets, the countries that normally buy this oil will compete with us for oil from our normal sources, driving prices up dramatically.

Threats to the straits are a “red line” for these countries. At least one Gulf Arab country, Bahrain, has declared that the Gulf countries are ready to “respond with force” if Iran attempts to block the straits.

Bahrain -- a key U.S. ally in the Gulf -- is home to the American Fifth Fleet, whose ships patrol the Persian Gulf and adjacent waters. The normal U.S. Navy presence in the Gulf has been reinforced recently to include two carrier strike groups. As the Iranians have spent years and resources developing the ability to close the straits, the U.S. Navy likewise has developed the means to keep them open.

The Iranians have experience confronting the U.S. Navy. In the 1980’s, during the Iran-Iraq war, American warships escorting Arab tankers often came under attack, including mine warfare. In 1988, the Iranians challenged the Americans in a significant surface action, with disastrous results. The Economist described Iran’s move as “how to waste a navy.”
The Gulf Arabs ability to respond with force against Iran is limited. While most of the six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates) have capable air forces, their naval capabilities are not sufficient to re-open the Straits of Hormuz. If there is action in the Gulf against the Iranians, it will be by American forces.

The more important point here – the Gulf Arabs have made it clear to Tehran that they are willing to use force to keep the oil flowing through the straits. Just as the world needs to buy the oil, they need to sell it. Should the crisis erupt into an armed confrontation, they will be standing with the United States. If we are concerned about base – naval and air – access in these countries for a coming confrontation with Iran, now is the time to ask.

Ahmadinejad is doing what the Americans have been unable to do – create a coalition against Iran.

The Damascus Option

Hardball — Fri, 09 Mar 2007 18:14:00 GMT

On March 10th, representatives of the United States will meet in Baghdad with representatives of numerous other countries, including Iran and Syria, in an attempt to resolve the violence in Iraq. I continue to maintain that these two countries are part of the problem in Iraq and unlikely to become part of the solution, especially Iran. Iran and the United States are currently involved in a proxy war in Iraq – the victor will emerge as the pre-eminent power in the Persian Gulf region. I don’t envision them helping us.

It is an interesting turn of events – much of the current violence in Iraq is directly attributable to the actions of Iran and Syria. Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, there was some low level cooperation between the Syrian and American intelligence services against al-Qaeda – Syria is a secular Baathist state with no interest in furthering the aims of a fundamentalist Islamic movement (which ironically, is who runs its ally Iran). However, since the removal of Saddam Hussein, Syria has been a conduit and suspected training ground for foreign insurgents entering Iraq as part of the al-Qaeda in Iraq organization.

Iran and Syria have been close allies since the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 when Damascus spurned its Arab neighbors and supported non-Arab Iran. The two countries just renewed a longstanding mutual defense pact. It’s a convenient arrangement – Iran gets access to Lebanon via Damascus to support Hezbollah (as we witnessed last summer), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. In turn, Syria gets cheap oil credits from Iran, a powerful ally in the region, and a bargaining chip in its demands for the return of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

Despite Syrian support to terrorist groups in Iraq, the United States continues to maintain diplomatic relations with Damascus. It has not always been friendly - I was the air attaché in Damascus for over two years and can personally attest to that. The level of U.S. representation changed in 2005 - following Syrian involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri in Beirut in February 2005, Washington withdrew our ambassador. While she has not yet returned, Syria continues to keep its ambassador in Washington.

Syria’s role in the Baghdad conference will be interesting to watch. Will it continue to be a puppet of Tehran or begin distancing itself in hopes of better relations with the United States and the West? Will the United States and Iran compete for Syria’s affections?

Syria’s overriding national interests are the return of the Golan Heights and renewed influence in Lebanon. If Syrian president Bashar al-Assad was assured that these two things could happen, he might be persuaded to distance himself from Iran. Driving a wedge between these two unlikely allies – a fundamentalist Shia theocracy in Iran and a secular socialist dictatorship in Syria – would be a spectacular diplomatic success. Not only would it re-energize the Middle East peace process, it would also cripple Iran’s ability to support Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

While Iran is focused on splitting atoms, we should focus on splitting the Tehran-Damascus alliance.

Francona on Libby verdict: Intelligence officers need better protection

Hardball — Tue, 06 Mar 2007 19:50:00 GMT

I had mixed thoughts as I heard the guilty verdicts read today. In 1991, after my return from Operation Desert Storm, I was assigned to the team drafting the Defense Department’s report on the war – Scooter was an Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of the effort. It was Scooter Libby that pinned on my Bronze Star in a Pentagon ceremony.

I also recall serving at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad in the late 1980’s, the same embassy where Joe Wilson later served as the deputy chief of mission. Joe did an outstanding job during those initial months of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent evacuation of American citizens and embassy staff.

Both men have served their country well. What continues to bother me is how these two public servants have ended up on opposites of a legal battle. The jury found Scooter Libby guilty of obstruction, false statements and perjury. What they did not find him guilty of is releasing the name of an intelligence officer under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. Nor should they have.

I am not a lawyer, but in my over 27 years as in intelligence officer, I know the rules on protecting the names of American intelligence officers and, more importantly, the foreign agents who we have recruited to provide us with otherwise unobtainable information. According to the extremely narrow and precise wording of the 1982 law, convicting anyone of violating this law is very unlikely. For example, the law requires that the person whose identity is to be protected has to have served in a covert or clandestine capacity overseas in the five years preceding the offense.

Why the arbitrary time period? Clandestine intelligence officers and their recruited assets need protection virtually the rest of their lives. If I was an officer of a foreign security service and knew that Mrs. Wilson had ever been in my country, I would find out everyone she ever talked to and determine just what was told to her – and that search would not be limited to the last five years. There is no convenient statute of limitations in other countries for this kind of activity, and given the places we have to operate, detection of – or in some cases, mere suspicion of – cooperation with an American intelligence service means lifelong incarceration at best, or a slow, agonizing death at worst.

If anything good comes out of this case, let’s hope it is better legislation that provides real protection to our intelligence officers and the people they need to recruit.

Pakistan, Do you remember Cambodia 1970?

Hardball — Tue, 06 Mar 2007 15:26:00 GMT

On April 30, 1970, President Richard Nixon announced that U.S. troops had begun the invasion of Cambodia, accusing the Southeast Asian nation of allowing North Vietnamese forces to use the country as a transit route and safe haven for its units operating in neighboring South Vietnam. After years of watching the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese using both Laos and Cambodia in this manner, American military commanders requested permission to chase the enemy into these neighboring countries. In 1970, Cambodia lost its “off limits” status.

Let’s fast forward to present day Afghanistan. The U.S. invasion (Operation Enduring Freedom) shortly following the attacks on the United States by al-Qaeda terrorists on Sept. 11, 2001, removed the Taliban-led government of the country and forced al-Qaeda to head for the mountains. After being cornered in the mountains of Tora Bora, most of the surviving al-Qaeda fighters fled to neighboring Pakistan, specifically to the federally administered tribal areas and the Pushtun provinces of North Waziristan and South Waziristan (where Islamabad exercises little authority).

Pakistani efforts to expel al-Qaeda from these areas have met with strong resistance from the local tribes, to the extent that in late 2006, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf struck a deal with the tribal leaders that he would maintain Islamabad’s “hands off” policy toward the area in return for the Pushtun leaders’ commitment to stop al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters from crossing the border into and out of Afghanistan.

That agreement was a farce. Al-Qaeda has effectively reconstituted itself in the tribal area, particularly in the Waziristans. Taliban fighters routinely use the area as a safe haven from pursuing American forces; they know full well that Pakistan has refused U.S. troops the right of “hot pursuit” to enter Pakistan. Pakistani forces will not confront the Taliban fighters.

Sounds just like Cambodia 1970.

Vice President Dick Cheney recently visited Pakistan with intelligence reports that indicate the level of al-Qaeda and Taliban activity in Pakistan on the Afghanistan border. Pakistani officials’ responses vary from claims that they are doing all they can to there is no al-Qaeda nor Taliban presence in their country.

Removing the Pakistan safe haven is critical to achieving success in Afghanistan and the larger global war on terror. At some point, the United States is going to tire of Pakistan’s seeming inability or apparent unwillingness to address the problem, and take it upon itself to resolve it, regardless of the risk to the longevity of the Musharraf government.

I’d say that time has come.

Is Iran an 'unstoppable train'?

Hardball — Wed, 28 Feb 2007 16:23:00 GMT

Just days after the United Nations declared that Iran failed to comply with a Security Council resolution demanding that Iran cease its uranium enrichment activities, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remarked, “Iran’s nuclear program is an unstoppable train without brakes.”

The Iranian “nuclear energy” program, which most analysts believe is a cover for a weapons development effort, is complemented by continued ballistic missile development. Last week, Iran announced that it had launched a rocket into earth orbit - nothing more than a test of long-range multi-stage missile. Iran has constantly reported developments and acquisitions of new and improved naval and air defense weapons.

In Iraq, American forces have detained members of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps special operations unit, the Qods (Jerusalem) Force. Iran is providing advanced weaponry to Shia militias, weapons that are killing American troops.

Against this backdrop, the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany are discussing how to deal with this “unstoppable train.” The obvious next step will be tougher sanctions, assuming that the Russians and Chinese agree – they basically gutted the sanctions effort two months ago.

It is doubtful stricter sanctions on Tehran will work, especially against a country that sits on the world’s second largest proved oil reserves and is OPEC’s number two oil exporter. As long as the world runs on oil, Iran will be difficult to cow. The world needs energy and will buy it. Taking almost four million barrels of crude per day off the world oil market is not likely to happen.

Assuming sanctions will not be effective in deterring Iran’s nuclear program, what’s next? We’re a long way from the military option, but the Iranians would be well-advised to realize that a military option down the track is a real possibility.

There is real discontent inside Iran. That discontent comes not only from the minority Azeri, Kurd, Arab and Baluch minorities, all of which have nationalist aspirations, but from the majority Persian population as well. The Persians fear that Ahmadinejad’s taunting of the West will further isolate Iran, viewed by many as a pariah state already. It is this fear that dealt a real blow to Ahmadinejad’s favored candidates in the recent municipal elections. The people are also blaming high unemployment and inflation on Ahmadinejad’s disastrous economic policies.

We should be, and probably are, cultivating these seeds of discontent. Radio broadcasts to these groups have struck a chord, evidenced by continued protests from the Iranian government. We should continue to drive a wedge between the government of Iran and the people of Iran – after all, this is not a government of the people.

Our objective should not be to change the regime, but to change its behavior. If the Iranian people want to change the regime, that should be up to them.

What happens in Iraq if Talabani can't serve?

Hardball — Mon, 26 Feb 2007 16:45:00 GMT

On Sunday, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani was flown by U.S. military aircraft from his residence in As-Sulaymaniyah to the King Hussein Medical City in Amman, Jordan, one of the best hospitals in the region. The reason for the medical evacuation is reportedly "exhaustion and a mild inflammation of the lungs."

I worked closely with “Mam Jalal,” as he is known to his friends, in northern Iraq while assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency in the mid-1990’s. Talabani, 73, is a Kurd with a long history of guerrilla operations against the Baath Party. In addition to serving as President of Iraq, he is the Secretary General of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). He has emerged as one of the few leaders in Iraq with the stature and political savvy to keep the nation from fracturing into three ethnic enclaves. Ironic – considering that for decades he was one of the key proponents of an independent Kurdistan.

Although the President of Iraq is the head of state, not the head of government, Jalal Talabani (right) is well respected among both the Sunni and Shia communities – few Iraqi politicians can claim that distinction - making him a valuable member of the governance team in Baghdad.

What happens if Talabani cannot return to his duties?

Talabani was acceptable as a compromise candidate for president – both the Sunni and Shia Arabs were willing to have a Kurdish president, and it was an inclusive gesture to the non-Arab Kurds. Should Talabani not be able to continue in office, succession may become a constitutional issue. The current Iraqi constitution states that “Presidential succession goes first to the deputy of the President of the Republic….” Currently, there are two deputies (vice presidents) as an interim measure until the second parliamentary elections. Which of the two vice presidents, one Sunni Arab and one Shia Arab, would take over? This will likely have to be decided in the Council of Representatives.

Given the existing animosity between the two sects and the raging sectarian violence, it seems logical that another Kurd would be elected as president. Two names come to mind: Barham Salih and Hoshyar Zebari. Both are filling key positions in the government – Salih is a deputy prime minister and Hoshyar Zebari is the foreign minister. I have worked with both – they are well-regarded across party and ethnic lines and either would make an excellent president.
Whether Talabani resumes his duties or is replaced by Barham or Hoshyar, they will have their work cut out for them – containing the savagery in Baghdad.